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Abstract
In auction and mechanism design, Myerson’s classical regularity condition
is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance,
ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the
boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces λ-regularity as a quan-
titative measure of how regular a distribution is. λ-regularity includes Myer-
son regularity and the monotone hazard rate condition as special cases. We
show that λ-regularity implies sharp bounds on various key quantities in auc-
tion theory, thus extending several recent findings from quantitative auction
and mechanism design.
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1 Introduction
Since Myerson (1981)’s seminal study of optimal auctions, his regularity condition
of increasing virtual valuations has been a cornerstone of the theory of auctions and
mechanism design. Yet Myerson reularity alone is often too weak to guarantee that
a model is sufficiently well-behaved for quantitative analysis, such as comparisons
of welfare versus revenues, or controlling probabilities of sale in an auction. This
liberality of Myerson regularity has become particularly apparent in the recent lit-
erature on algorithmic mechanism design, where it typically needs enforcement by
additional assumptions.1 This literature aims at turning mechanism design more
scalable and more quantitative, and therefore often well suited for many real world
problems. By replacing the classical objective of optimality with the more modest
goal of guaranteeing a good approximation of the optimal outcome, various chal-
lenging problems (asymmetry, uncertainty about distributions, complex preferences
over multiple objects...) can now be handled to a degree that was previously out
of reach. For example, several papers analyze successful auction design if only a
sample from the bid distribution is known, thereby dropping the classical assump-
tion of common knowledge of distributions.2 Thus these analyses also provide at
least partial answers to Wilson (1987)’s critique that asked for a more detail-free
approach towards mechanism design.
In many applications, it is desired to estimate quantities such as the ratio of revenue
to welfare for a large class of admissible distributions – ideally, for all regular dis-
tributions. Yet as the distributions at the boundary of Myerson regularity behave
badly, uniform estimates for all regular distributions cannot exist. In such cases,
quantitative estimates have often been obtained by restricting the set of admissible
distributions to those that fulfill the monotone hazard rate condition, also known as
increasing failure rate (IFR).3 Quantitatively, IFR distributions are easier to handle
as they have convenient properties such as log-concavity of the survival function
“1− F”. Further, they easily compare to exponential distributions. This facilitates
1See Hartline (2014) and Roughgarden (2015).
2See, e.g., Dhangwatnotai et al. (2014) or Azar et al. (2014).
3We provide various references in Section 3.1. The monotone hazard rate condition is, of course,
not a recent invention but has been a convenient assumption in the microeconomics literature for
decades, see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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analysis a lot.
Moving from the Myerson regular to the monotone hazard rate case, the class of
admissible distributions becomes considerably smaller. For example, the class of
Myerson regular distributions contains heavy-tailed (power law) distributions. These
are ruled out under the monotone hazard rate condition under which the exponential
distribution marks the boundary of the admissible heaviness of tails. Further, the
monotone hazard rate condition rules out many local irregularities of distributions
that fulfill Myerson regularity. Both aspects may matter in many applications.
Thus, it would be good to impose less than the monotone hazard rate condition,
while still being able to provide quantitative analyses for which Myerson regularity
alone is not strong enough.
In this paper, we propose an alternative strengthening of Myerson regularity in
order to provide a weaker replacement for the monotone hazard rate condition, that
nevertheless has essentially the same scope for obtaining quantitative bounds. To
this purpose we introduce λ-regularity. A distribution is λ-regular if the slope of
the virtual valuations function is bounded from below by ε = 1− λ for some λ ≤ 1.
1-regularity is thus exactly Myerson regularity. λ = 0, i.e. ε = 1, corresponds to the
monotone hazard rate condition. Choosing ε ∈ (0, 1) interpolates between the two
cases.
λ-regularity has many key properties in common with both the monotone hazard rate
condition and Myerson regularity. λ-regularity has an alternative representation in
terms of monotonicity of a generalized hazard rate, a generalized concavity condition
on the survival function, and allows for comparison (in the convex-transform order)
with an explicit class of reference distributions. The latter two properties link λ-
regularity with two rich and distinct bodies of work in applied mathematics, the
literature on generalized notions of concavity and the literature on reliability and
stochastic orders.4
Combining these two perspectives and the tools they imply, we first extend a series of
quantitative estimates about the single bidder case from the monotone hazard rate
case to the λ-regular case. These results have been used heavily in the algorithmic
4For pointers to the former literature, see, e.g., Balogh and Ewerhart (2014), for an introduction
to the latter Marshall and Olkin (2007) or Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
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mechanism design literature. There, quantitative estimates for λ = 0 are often
contrasted against their breakdown for λ = 1.5 Our estimates continue to hold for
any λ < 1 with constants that (must) blow up in the limit λ → 1. In particular,
we confirm that it is, in a sense, merely the boundary of Myerson regularity that
typically causes problems. We then turn to a number of results about order statistics
and the n-bidder case. We provide a lower bound on the revenue-to-welfare ratio in
single-object auctions, and some additional bounds on small order statistics. As an
application beyond mechanism design, the latter bounds also provide sharp estimates
for a family of generalized Gini indices for the measurement of inequality.
Related Literature
To our knowledge, so far, the connection between λ-regularity and results in reliabil-
ity theory has been explored in economics only for the monotone hazard condition
and the comparison with the exponential distribution it entails. In some applica-
tions, the monotone hazard rate condition is a boundary case at which the compar-
ative statics of the model change fundamentally.6 In other applications, monotone
hazard rates are assumed in order to obtain some quantitative control of the under-
lying distributions. In the latter cases, λ-regularity is an attractive replacement.
There is a small literature investigating the connection between generalized concav-
ity and conditions related to increasing virtual valuations. Applications of general-
ized concavity in economics begin with Caplin and Nalebuff (1991a,b). Our work
is related to applications in equilibrium and price theory such as Anderson and Re-
nault (2003) or Weyl and Fabinger (2013) and, especially, the applications in auction
theory by Ewerhart (2013) and Mares and Swinkels (2011, 2014). Of these works,
Anderson and Renault (2003) are specifically close in spirit to our paper, though
they study a different context. They derive elementary, quantitative bounds on key
quantities of a Cournot competition model in terms of generalized concavity of the
demand (or survival) function. Ewerhart (2013) is complementary to our paper,
providing explicit conditions for λ-regularity in terms of the density function, and
5For a typical example, see Aggarwal et al. (2009).
6For instance, whether the expected difference between the two highest valuations is increasing
or decreasing in the number of bidders switches at the exponential boundary case.This observation
is central, e.g., to Moldovanu et al. (2007, 2008) and to Szech (2011).
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a discussion of parametric distribution classes that satisfy the condition.7 Finally,
generalized concavity has been applied in the study of procurement auctions with
asymmetric valuation distributions by Mares and Swinkels (2011, 2014). In the pro-
curement setting, small realizations of a cost parameter replace large realizations of
valuations. Therefore, issues of heavy tails and infinite expected values do not arise
like in classical auctions. Mares and Swinkels (2011, 2014) focus on handling two
challenging particular applications. Our focus is on providing λ-regular versions of
key tools that have been used in numerous papers.
The statistical implications of λ-regularity have hardly been explored beyond the
case λ = 0. For one thing, this concerns the direct use of tools from reliability theory.
For another, the formulation of λ-regularity in terms of a generalized monotone
hazard rate condition proves to be powerful in several of our proofs since it enables
us to directly adapt arguments from the monotone hazard rate case. As all these
perspectives are equivalent, it is possible to replace one technique of proof by another
in some cases. Yet often, a result follows much more easily from one perspective
than from another.8
Outline
Section 2 introduces λ-regularity, discusses equivalent formulations and provides
some structural properties such as existence of moments and invariance under mono-
tone, concave transformations. Section 3 presents our performance bounds and dis-
cusses their implications in the algorithmic mechanism design literature. Section
4 shows that some of the key results of Section 3 remain valid when λ-regularity
is replaced by an even weaker notion that we call λ∗-regularity. λ∗-regularity is a
generalization of the IFRA (increasing failure rate average) property in the same
way that λ-regularity generalizes the monotone hazard rate condition. Section 5.1
7Ewerhart’s interest in λ-regular distributions is not so much motivated by quantitative con-
siderations but rather by the fact that in some generalized auction models the classical regularity
condition is replaced by λ-regularity. See his paper for references. Our results also apply in these
settings.
8For two concrete examples, Ewerhart (2013)’s sufficient condition for λ-regularity relies on
deep results from the generalized concavity literature. In the monotone hazard rate case, similar
implications of log-concavity have been studied by Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). In contrast,
our results on existence of moments under λ-regularity is very much in the tradition of reliability
theory.
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points out converses of our results if the slope of virtual valuations is bounded from
above rather than from below. Prominent special cases of this condition are the
assumptions of a decreasing density or decreasing failure rate. Section 5.2 discusses
λ-regularity in relation to hyperregularity, an alternative strenghtening of Myerson
regularity proposed by Kleinberg and Yuan (2013). Hyperregularity corresponds to
the increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) condition of Lariviere and Porteus
(2001) which has been studied quite a bit in the revenue management literature.
We provide pointers to this literature as well. Finally, Section 6 provides an inter-
pretation of λ-regularity when the framework is transformed from a price-setting to
a quantity-setting problem. For the classical regularity condition, interpretations of
this transformation go back to Bulow and Roberts (1989). Section 7 concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
2 λ-Regularity
Throughout, we assume that probability distribution functions F have a continu-
ously differentiable density f that is positive in the interior of the support (α, ω)
of F where 0 ≤ α < ω ≤ ∞.9 We treat F as probability distribution on R+ with
f(x) = 0 outside the support, and denote by X a random variable distributed ac-
cording to F . Unless otherwise noted, we use the term increasing in the meaning of
weakly increasing, and analogously for decreasing, convex and concave.
We say that F is λ-regular for some (possibly negative) λ ≤ 1 if the generalized
virtual valuations function
vλ(x) = λx− 1− F (x)
f(x)
is increasing over (α, ω). This is equivalent to assuming that the slope of the classical
virtual valuations function v1 is bounded from below by 1 − λ, v′1(x) ≥ 1 − λ. 1-
regularity is thus Myerson’s regularity assumption, while 0-regularity corresponds
to the classical monotone hazard condition, also known as the increasing failure
9Assuming positivity is essentially without loss of generality as gaps in the support would lead
to a violation of Myerson regularity. We use the smoothness assumption mainly in the proof of
Proposition 1 where it could be relaxed with the same techniques as in Lemma 1 of Ewerhart
(2013).
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rate condition (IFR). For λ1 < λ2, λ1-regularity implies λ2-regularity. In particular,
λ-regularity for some λ < 1 implies Myerson regularity.
In the following, we argue that λ-regularity with λ 6= 0 has many properties in
common with the increasing failure rate condition λ = 0. As a first step, we define
the generalized failure rate
rλ(x) =
f(x)
(1− F (x))1+λ .
As we will see below, monotonicity of rλ is equivalent to monotonicity of vλ. The
following lemma states that any distribution F may be expressed in terms of the
rate rλ.
Lemma 1. For λ ≤ 1, λ 6= 0, and x ≥ 0, we can write
1− F (x) = Γλ (Hλ(x))
where the decreasing function Γλ : R+ → [0, 1] is given by
Γλ(x) =
0 when λ < 0 and x > − 1λ(1 + λx)− 1λ otherwise
and where
Hλ(x) =
∫ x
0
rλ(y)dy.
For the classical failure rate with λ = 0, this is a familiar result where the function Γλ
is replaced by its limit Γ0(x) = exp(−x). Based on the lemma, it is straightforward
to define families of distributions for which the rate rλ is constant. For later use,
we define two such families, Gρ,λ and Fµ,λ. These are the same distributions, once
parametrized by their constant generalized failure rate and once parametrized by
their mean (if it exists).10
Definition 1.
(i) For ρ > 0 and λ 6= 0, define the probability distribution Gρ,λ by
Gρ,λ(x) = 1− Γλ(ρ · x) = 1− (1 + λρx)−
1
λ
10In the definition, the expressions for the mean follow from applying Lemma 7 in the Appendix
with a = 0 and b = ρ.
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with support (0,∞) for λ > 0 and support
(
0,− 1
ρ λ
)
for λ < 0. The generalized
failure rate of Gρ,λ satisfies rλ(x) = ρ for all x in the support. Moreover, for λ < 1,
Gρ,λ has mean µ =
1
ρ(1−λ) .
(ii) For µ > 0, λ < 1, λ 6= 0, define the probability distribution Fµ,λ by
Fµ,λ(x) = 1− Γλ
(
x
µ(1− λ)
)
with support (0,∞) for λ ∈ (0, 1) and support
(
0,−µ(1−λ)
λ
)
for λ < 0. Fµ,λ has
constant rate rλ(x) =
1
µ(1−λ) and mean µ.
For λ < 0, the distributions Gρ,λ and Fµ,λ are thus a subclass of (rescaled) Beta
distributions, while the distributions for λ > 0 are Pareto distributions. The dis-
tribution G1,1 is a horizontal shift of the equal-revenue distribution. The latter is
a well-known distribution at the boundary of Myerson regularity.11 For λ → 0,
Fµ,λ converges to an exponential distribution with rate µ. Finally, λ = −1 yields a
uniform distribution.
The next proposition draws the connection between generalized virtual valuations,
generalized failure rates, generalized concavity of 1−F , and a comparison with the
boundary cases Gρ,λ in the convex-transform order.
Proposition 1. The following claims are equivalent for any λ 6= 0.
(i) F is λ-regular, i.e., vλ is increasing.
(ii) The rate rλ associated with F is increasing.
(iii) The function 1− F is (−λ)-concave, i.e.,
− (1− F (x))
−λ
λ
is concave in x.
(iv) F is dominated by G1,λ in the convex-transform order, i.e., Hλ(x) = G
−1
1,λ(F (x))
is convex in x.
11See, e.g., the monograph Hartline (2014). The equal-revenue distribution has the distribution
function G1,1(x− 1) = 1− x−1 with support (1,∞).
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Part (iii) of the proposition corresponds to log-concavity of 1− F in the monotone
hazard rate case λ = 0, and to concavity of 1 − F for λ = −1. The expression
“(−λ)-concavity of 1−F” follows the terminology of ρ-concavity as applied, e.g., in
Ewerhart (2013).
Many of the ingredients of the proposition have appeared before, in different lines
of research. For the regular case λ = 1, the equivalence of (i) and (iii) was first
observed in McAfee and McMillan (1987). The equivalence of Myerson’s regular-
ity to monotonicity of the rate r1 is discussed in Ewerhart (2013) and applied in
Szech (2011). In the revenue management literature, parts (i-iii) of the proposition
(with λ = 1) had independently been suggested as conditions on demand curves.12
Equivalence of (iii) and (iv) was observed already in van Zwet (1964, Section 4.3.2).
Equivalence of (ii) and (iv) has been applied in the auctions literature mainly for
λ = 0 where it corresponds to a comparison with the exponential distribution under
the monotone hazard rate condition.13 Ewerhart (2013) and Mares and Swinkels
(2011, 2014) discuss the family of conditions for varying λ, focusing mainly on the
equivalence of (i) and (iii).14
Our formulation emphasizes two aspects that will be fruitful to exploit:
(i) Combining the proposition with Lemma 1 enables us to apply monotonicity
of the generalized rate rλ almost like a classical monotone hazard rate as-
sumption. This idea is a key ingredient in many of the proofs of the following
section.
(ii) Part (iv) of the proposition connects λ-regularity to a sizable literature in
reliability theory that considers classes of distributions that are dominated by
a reference distribution in terms of the convex-transform order.15 The next
proposition collects two more structural results that rely on arguments adapted
12See Section 5.2 below and Ziya et al. (2004) for details.
13Many applications of the monotone hazard rate condition in auction theory can be interpreted
in this way, see the next section for examples. Similarly, the assumption that the density is
monotonic, λ = −1, can often be interpreted as a comparison with the uniform distribution.
14Mares and Swinkels (2011, 2014) consider procurement auctions where virtual valuations are
replaced by virtual costs x + F (x)/f(x) and the focus is on small values of x. Since the support
of F is bounded from below but not from above, issues of heavy tails and infinite expected values
are negligible in the procurement setting.
15Two seminal early references are van Zwet (1964) and Barlow and Proschan (1966). See
Chapter 4.B of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for an overview and a collection of implications.
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from this literature.
Proposition 2.
(i) Let F be λ-regular for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Then E[Xp] is finite for all p ∈ [1, 1
λ
).
(ii) Let F be λ-regular for some λ ≤ 1 and let the mapping h : R+ → R+ be concave
and strictly increasing. Then the distribution of h(X) is λ-regular as well.
The first part of the proposition guarantees that λ-regular distributions with λ < 1
always possess a finite mean. Similarly, all distributions that are λ-regular for some
λ < 1
2
possess a finite variance.16 As can be seen from the proof, it actually suffices
to have λ-regularity in the tails of a distribution, i.e., from some threshold on. The
second part shows that λ-regularity is inherited by linear shifts and stretches of F .
Conversely to λ-regularity, we define λ-antiregularity as follows. A distribution F
is λ-antiregular for some λ ≤ 1 if the function vλ(x) is decreasing in x. While
λ-regularity postulates that the tails of the distribution are not too heavy, λ-
antiregularity postulates that the tails are sufficiently heavy. The most common
assumptions of this type are 0-antiregularity which is the classical decreasing failure
rate condition (DFR), and (−1)-antiregularity which is equivalent to the density f
being decreasing. Many of our results have counterparts in the antiregular case.
These are discussed in Section 5.1 below.
3 Performance Bounds
This section shows how to generalize performance bounds for sales mechanisms from
the monotone hazard rate case to the general λ-regular case with λ < 1. We thus
demonstrate that these performance bounds continue to hold (with different con-
stants) right up to the boundary of Myerson regularity. In typical applications from
algorithmic mechanism design, the monotone hazard rate condition enters through
elementary observations about the single-bidder case. These observations are used
to analyze more complex mechanisms in a modular fashion. For example, Lemma 3
below provides a lower bound on the probability that a single bidder has a valuation
16We exclude the cases λ ≤ 0. 0-regularity, i.e., the monotone hazard rate condition, implies
finiteness of all moments, see Barlow and Proschan (1965). λ-regularity with negative λ implies
0-regularity and thus existence of all moments.
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above Myerson’s optimal reserve price. This result implies bounds on the probability
that the item is (not) sold even with many bidders. For this reason, most of the re-
sults below focus on the single bidder case – even though the intended applications
are complex problems with multiple items and many bidders. In particular, how
to proceed from the single-bidder case to more complex settings is known in many
cases. Generalizing the “input” results for the single-bidder case to λ-regularity is
often sufficient for generalizing the final results. Section 3.1 gathers the key inputs
of this type for various papers in the algorithmic mechanism design literature. Some
implications of λ-regularity that explicitly address the case of multiple agents are
presented in Section 3.2.
3.1 Basic Bounds
When selling to a buyer whose valuation X is distributed according to F , the optimal
posted price can be found via the virtual valuation function. This is shown in
Myerson (1981). The revenue-optimal posted price p∗ is exactly the value at which
the virtual valuation function v1 turns zero. The same value p
∗ is also the revenue-
optimal reserve price in an auction with many bidders with independent private
valuations.
On an unbounded state space, Myerson regularity does not guarantee the existence
of the reserve p∗. λ-regularity, however, implies existence and uniqueness of p∗.
Lemma 2. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1. Then there exists a unique reserve
p∗ ∈ (α, ω) with v1(p∗) = 0.
Lemma 3 provides lower bounds on the probabilities that the buyer valuation X lies
above the mean of F , and above the reserve p∗, respectively. Both bounds are sharp
for boundary cases in which vλ is constant.
Lemma 3. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1, λ 6= 0. Denote by µ the mean of
F and by p∗ the unique zero of v1, i.e., the reserve. Then the following boundaries
hold:
P (X > µ) ≥ Γλ
(
1
1− λ
)
= (1− λ) 1λ
and
P (X > p∗) = P (v1(X) > 0) ≥ (1− λ) 1λ .
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In the monotone hazard rate case, λ = 0, the constant on the right hand side of
both inequalities of Lemma 3 converges to exp(−1) ≈ 0.368. In this form, both
inequalities have been applied frequently in the literature. In some cases, this is the
only place where the monotone hazard rate assumption enters so that the results of
the papers generalize instantly to the λ-regular case.17 The dependence of the lower
bound on λ is shown in Figure 1. We see that λ = 0 is far from an exceptional value
in this perspective. At λ = 1/2, the threshold where variances may become infinite,
the bound is still at 0.25 and thus far from zero.
As a consequence of Lemma 3, we obtain bounds which control the entire distribution
function F up to, respectively, p∗ and µ in terms of the boundary cases Fµ,λ from
Definition 1. In the monotone hazard rate case, a result of this type is the main
ingredient of Aggarwal et al. (2009) who study the welfare losses of revenue-optimal
mechanisms.
Corollary 1. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1, λ 6= 0. Denote by µ the mean of
F and by p∗ the unique zero of v1, i.e., the reserve. Then the following bounds are
obtained:
1− F (x) ≥ 1− Fµ,λ(x)
for x ∈ [0, µ], and
1− F (x) ≥ 1− Fp∗,λ(x)
for x ∈ [0, p∗].
The lemma is again sharp for F = Fµ,λ. For the boundary cases Fµ,λ, the optimal
reserve price p∗ coincides with the mean µ. This holds as the virtual valuations
functions v1 are linear if vλ is constant. Therefore,
18
0 = E[v1(X)] = v1(µ).
This explains why we obtain the same constants in the two inequalities of Lemma
17The first inequality is e.g. used in Hartline et al. (2008) and Azar et al. (2013), the second one
in Hartline et al. (2008), Aggarwal et al. (2009), Daskalakis and Pierrakos (2011) and Cigler et al.
(2015). In Daskalakis and Pierrakos (2011) and in Cigler et al. (2014), this is the only application
of the monotone hazard rate assumption.
18The first equality is an elementary property of virtual valuations which holds whenever E[X]
is finite.
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3. For general λ-regular distributions, the ranking of p∗ and µ is ambiguous.19 It
depends on the distribution which of the two bounds in Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 are
sharper. Direct proofs are in the appendix, yet the inequalities involving the mean
in Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 can also be deduced directly from classical results
in reliability theory, using Proposition 1 (iv).20 In this literature, similar results
involving higher moments or quantiles of F are also available, but – predictably –
no results involving optimal reserve prices.21
The next lemma provides a sharp bound on the probability that a valuation lies
above the optimal monopoly profit. This result is a central ingredient in Sundarara-
jan and Yan (2015)’s analysis of robust mechanism design for risk-averse sellers.
Sundararajan and Yan (2015) prove the result separately for λ = 0 and λ = 1.22
Lemma 4. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1, λ 6= 0. Denote by p∗ the unique zero
of v1 and by R
∗ = p∗(1 − F (p∗)) the optimal monopoly profit. Then the following
boundary holds:
1− F (R∗) ≥ Γλ
(
Γλ
(
1
1−λ
)
1− λ
)
.
For λ ∈ {0, 1}, the constant on the right hand side converges to the values 1/2 for
λ = 1 and exp(− exp(−1)) ≈ 0.6922 for λ = 0 as identified by Sundararajan and
Yan (2015).23 The (weak) dependence of the lower bound on λ is shown in Figure
1.
Our next result provides a sharp bound between the expected value of F and the
supremum of p(1− F (p)). When selling to a single buyer, these two quantities can
be interpreted as the expected welfare generated by a welfare-optimal mechanism
and the expected revenue of a revenue-optimal mechanism. In the terminology of
19One can obtain a clear ranking when virtual valuations are concave or convex by applying
Jensen’s inequality to 0 = E[v1(X)] and using the monotonicity of v1.
20See, for instance, Proposition 6.2 in Chapter 4 of Barlow and Proschan (1981).
21In Section 4 below, we show that our results on optimal reserve prices remain valid under
λ∗-regularity, a further weakening of λ-regularity.
22See their Lemmas 18 and 19. They use different techniques of proof for the two results. Our
proof extends their proof for λ = 0.
23Unlike most results in this section, this bound does not deteriorate at λ = 1.
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Figure 1: The lower bounds of Lemma 3 (solid line) and Lemma 4 (dashed line) as
functions of λ.
Kleinberg and Yuan (2013), the result shows that λ-regular distributions are always
c-bounded with an explicit value of the constant c.24
Proposition 3. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1, λ 6= 0. Denote by µ the mean
of F and by p∗ the unique zero of v1. Then we have the bound
µ ≤
(
1
1− λ
) 1
λ
sup
p
p(1− F (p)) =
(
1
1− λ
) 1
λ
p∗(1− F (p∗))
Proposition 3 can be seen as a corollary of Proposition 5 in Anderson and Renault
(2003) where the result is phrased in the terminology of demand functions and
Cournot competition.25 A second result in this vein bounds the expected welfare
generated by selling with a given reserve price p against expected revenues. The
result also applies to suboptimal values of p and can thus be applied in settings
where only an estimate of p∗ is available.
Proposition 4. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1, λ 6= 0. Denote by µ the mean
24Kleinberg and Yuan (2013) introduce c-boundedness as a third, separate assumption in addition
to 1-regularity and the hyperregularity condition discussed in Section 5.2. Proposition 3 provides
an elementary sufficient condition for c-boundedness.
25Anderson and Renault (2003) prove several related results but this is the only actual overlap.
The techniques of proof are also different since Anderson and Renault rely almost exclusively on
the (−λ)-concavity formulation of λ-regularity.
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of F and by p∗ the unique zero of v1. Then we have the bounds
E
[
X 1{X≥p}
] ≤ ( 1
1− λ
) 1
λ
p∗(1− F (p∗))
for all p ≥ 0, and, for p ≥ p∗,
E
[
X 1{X≥p}
] ≤ (1 + 1
1− λ
)
p(1− F (p)).
In the monotone hazard rate case, this result is a key ingredient in Dhangwatnotai
et al. (2014), see also Yan (2012).26 The proposition is the only consequence of the
monotone hazard condition used in Azar et al. (2014). The latter paper studies
sales mechanisms when only a sample from the bid distributions is available while
the underlying distributions of valuations are unknown. The authors provide two
sets of results, one for the regular case under a symmetry assumption on the bidders,
another under the monotone hazard rate condition without the symmetry assump-
tion. Proposition 4 extends the second set of results to the asymmetric, λ-regular
case.
3.2 Bounds on Order Statistics
In this section, we show how order statistics can be handled using λ-regularity.
Order statistics frequently arise in auction settings but not only there. At the end
of the section, we show that λ-regularity also implies sharp upper bounds on Gini
indices and related quantities.
There are n independent random variables X1, . . . , Xn with distribution F . We
denote by Xk:n the k
th largest of these, so that X1:n is the largest and Xn:n is the
smallest.27 The following lemma states a direct consequence of λ-regularity:
Lemma 5. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1. Then, the sequence (an)n≥1 defined
26Dhangwatnotai et al. (2014) combine the two inequalities into a single one with the worse
constant max(2, exp(1)) = exp(1) for λ = 0. Since the dependence on λ differs between the two
cases, we keep two separate inequalities.
27In particular, we follow the standard notation in auction theory rather than in statistics where
Xn:n would denote the largest order statistic.
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by a1 = (λ− 1)E[X1] and, for n ≥ 2,
an = E[X2:n]− (1− λ)E[X1:n]
is increasing and concave.
An immediate corollary is the following lower bound on the ratio of optimal revenues
and optimal welfare when selling a single asset to n bidders with i.i.d λ-regular
valuations. Recall that with n bidders optimal revenue is given by
R∗n = E[max(0, v1(X1:n))]
as shown in Myerson (1981). The welfare generated by a welfare-maximizing mech-
anism is given by E[X1:n] ≥ R∗n.
Corollary 2. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1. Then we have, for n ≥ 2, the
bound
R∗n
E[X1:n]
≥ E[X2:n]
E[X1:n]
≥ (1− λ)
(
1− E[X1]
E[X1:n]
)
.
In the corollary, the second inequality bounding second order statistics from below
is sharp. We see that λ-regularity with λ < 1 keeps the ratios on the left hand sides
bounded away from zero as n grows. Kleinberg and Yuan (2013) demonstrate by a
counterexample28 that the same revenue to welfare ratios may vanish for 1-regular
distributions and introduce an additional assumption, hyperregularity, to ensure
that it remains bounded away from zero. The corollary shows that λ-regularity
rules out counterexamples like this. We further discuss the relation between hyper-
regularity and λ-regularity in Section 5.2.
Our final results study the behavior of smallest rather than largest order statistics.
We first show an upper bound on the larger out of two independent draws from F
in terms of the smaller.
Lemma 6. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1. Then we have the chain of inequal-
ities
E[X1:2] ≤ 3− λ
2− λE[X1] ≤
2− λ
1− λE[X2:2].
28Roughly speaking, their example differs from boundary cases of 1-regularity only by a loga-
rithmic factor. The example is thus 1-regular but not λ-regular for any λ < 1.
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Again, this result is sharp for boundary cases of λ-regularity. As λ increases, the
constants in the chain of inequalities become larger, allowing for a greater spread
between the smaller and larger out of two draws. A variation of the argument behind
the lemma implies an upper bound on the generalized Gini indices of Donaldson and
Weymark (1983), see Kleiber and Kotz (2003) for background.
Corollary 3. Let F be λ-regular for some λ < 1 and let n ≥ 2. Then we have the
bound
Gn = 1− E[Xn:n]
E[X1]
≥ n− 1
n− λ.
Here, G2 coincides with the classical Gini index which measures economic inequal-
ity by comparing the wealth of the poorer of two people to the average wealth in
the population. The generalized index Gn replaces the poorest out of two with the
poorest out of n people, thus shifting attention to the extremes of the distribution.
Increasing λ increases the upper bound on economic inequality that is possible un-
der a λ-regular distribution of wealth. Again, the bound is sharp for all n at the
boundary cases of λ-regularity.29
4 λ∗-regularity
In this section, we show that some of our results already hold under a weaker notion
of regularity than λ-regularity. This includes, in particular the bounds on sales
probabilities from Lemma 3 which had been applied frequently for the case λ = 0.
The reliability literature (e.g. Barlow and Proschan, 1981) has explored various
weaker forms of the monotone hazard rate condition which retain the exponential
distribution as a boundary case but place less rigid local restrictions on the shape
of the hazard rate. One prominent example is the increasing failure rate average
(IFRA) condition. When moving beyond the exponential distribution as a refer-
ence distribution, IFRA distributions turn into the class of distributions which are
dominated by a reference distribution in terms of the star order30 (rather than the
stronger convex-transform order we had above). The following proposition defines
29Donaldson and Weymark (1983) actually define Gn with a continuous parameter n. Our result
also applies to this case but the term E[Xn:n] in the definition needs to be replaced by it continuous
analogue, the right hand side of equation (7) below.
30See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for an introduction and various implications.
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λ∗-regularity, the analogous weakening of λ-regularity, and introduces some equiva-
lent formulations:
Proposition 5. The following claims are equivalent for any λ 6= 0 and x > 0:
(i) F is λ∗-regular, i.e., Hλ(x)
x
is increasing in x.
(ii) For all x,
Hλ(x) ≤ rλ(x) · x.
(iii) For all x and θ ∈ [0, 1],
Hλ(θ · x) ≤ θ ·Hλ(x).
Since Hλ(x) = G
−1
1,λ(F (x)), λ
∗-regularity is the same as F being dominated by G1,λ
in the star order which is defined as monotonicity of G−11,λ(F (x))/x. From part (i)
of the proposition, we see that at the boundary of λ∗-regularity the function Hλ
is linear with Hλ(0) = 0. λ
∗-regularity thus has the same boundary cases as λ-
regularity. Parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition always hold when Hλ is convex.
Thus, λ∗-regularity is implied by λ-regularity. To understand the difference between
λ-regularity and λ∗-regularity better, we write part (iii) of the proposition as
Hλ(θ · x+ (1− θ) · 0) ≤ θ ·H(x) + (1− θ)H(0).
Instead of assuming convexity – and thus global validity of Jensen’s inequality –
λ∗-regularity merely requires that Jensen’s inequality holds when one of the points
is zero. Another way to see that λ∗-regularity is connected to “convexity in reference
to zero” is to write (ii) as
Hλ(x)−H ′λ(x) · x ≤ Hλ(0) = 0.
Thus, the tangent to Hλ at a point x need not lie below the graph of Hλ globally,
but it must do so at zero. Looking through Section 3, we see that some of the
proofs remain valid under λ∗-regularity since convexity in reference to zero is the
only consequence of λ-regularity we use.
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Corollary 4. Let F be λ∗-regular for some λ < 1, λ 6= 0, and suppose there exists
a unique p∗ with v1(p∗) = 0. Then we have the bounds
P (X > p∗) ≥ (1− λ) 1λ ,
for x ∈ [0, p∗]
1− F (x) ≥ 1− Fp∗,λ(x),
and
1− F (R∗) ≥ Γλ
(
Γλ
(
1
1−λ
)
1− λ
)
where R∗ = p∗(1− F (p∗).
Notice that we have to assume existence and uniqueness of p∗ separately under λ∗-
regularity, since Lemma 2 is no longer available. Similarly, λ∗-regularity does not
imply Myerson’s regularity.
5 λ-Antiregularity and Hyperregularity
5.1 λ-Antiregularity
This section explores which of the results of the previous sections have counterparts
in the λ-antiregular case in which the function vλ is decreasing instead of increasing.
For λ1 < λ2, λ2-antiregularity implies λ1-antiregularity. This direction of impli-
cations is opposite to the one in the λ-regular case. 0-antiregularity (decreasing
failure rate) implies (−1)-antiregularity (decreasing density), while 0-regularity (in-
creasing failure rate) implies 1-regularity (Myerson regularity). λ1-antiregularity
and λ2-regularity can only hold simultaneously if λ1 ≤ λ2. If a distribution is simul-
taneously (−1)-antiregular and 1-regular, it has sufficiently heavy tails in the sense
of a decreasing density, and not too heavy tails in the sense of Myerson regularity.
Therefore, in many results, assuming a decreasing density generates bounds in the
opposite direction to those implied by λ-regularity.
As antiregularity only guarantees that tails are sufficiently heavy, it cannot guar-
antee integrability as in Proposition 2 (i), or existence and uniqueness of optimal
reserve prices as in Lemma 2. We thus assume for the remainder of this section that
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distributions are 1-regular, and possess a finite expected value and a unique optimal
reserve price. We next go through the results from the λ-regular case step by step,
highlighting what happens when replacing λ-regularity by λ-antiregularity. In all
cases, the proofs follow directly from those for the λ-regular case.
• Lemma 1 does not rely on λ-regularity and continues to hold. The boundary
cases of Definition 1 are both λ-regular and λ-antiregular.
• The equivalences in Proposition 1 continue to hold with the following modifica-
tions: vλ being decreasing is equivalent to rλ being decreasing, the expression
in part (iii) being convex, and G−11,λ(F (x)) being concave.
• Conversely to Proposition 2 (ii), increasing convex transformations of a random
variable with λ-antiregular distribution have a λ-antiregular distribution.
• The five lower bounds in Lemma 3, Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 turn into upper
bounds under antiregularity. The same is true for the analogous generalization
of Corollary 4.
• The upper bound in Proposition 3 turns into a lower bound. Proposition 4
does not have a direct converse in the antiregular case since the estimates are
not sharp.
• The sequence defined in Lemma 5 becomes decreasing and convex. Accord-
ingly, the lower bound on the ratio of second and first order statistics in Corol-
lary 2 is reversed. The lower bound on expected revenues in optimal auctions
is not reversed however.
• The chain of inequalities in Lemma 6 is reversed and the lower bound in
Corollary 3 becomes an upper bound.
5.2 Hyperregularity
Kleinberg and Yuan (2013) propose an alternative strengthening of Myerson’s reg-
ularity which they call hyperregularity. They assume that, in addition to F being
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1-regular, the function v1(x)/x is increasing, or, equivalently the rate
x · r0(x) = xf(x)
1− F (x)
is increasing.31 This monotonicity condition is well-known in the revenue manage-
ment literature. There, it was introduced by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) under
the name increasing generalized failure rate condition (IGFR) as a sufficient condi-
tion for unimodality of x(1 − F (x)). We refer to Banciu and Mirchandani (2013)
for a recent contribution with many references. Lariviere (2006) provides a sum-
mary of structural results about IGFR distributions, showing, for example, that the
IGFR property is equivalent to the distribution of log(X) satisfying the classical
IFR condition.
Ziya et al. (2004) provide a comparison between IGFR and Myerson regularity from
the perspective of revenue management, concluding that, in general, neither condi-
tion is to be preferred over the other.32 IGFR is weaker than Myerson’s regularity
in the sense that it holds for distributions with arbitrarily heavy polynomial tails.
Yet it is more restrictive in the sense that it may disappear under horizontal shifts
of the distribution. For example, consider the parametric class of distributions
F (x) = 1 − (x + a)−b with support (1 − a,∞) where a < 1 and b > 0. We have
vλ(x) = (λ − 1b )x + ab . F is thus λ-regular for all a and all b ≥ 1/λ. In particular,
F is Myerson regular for b ≥ 1. The location parameter a does not matter, but the
heaviness of tails, parametrized by b, does. In contrast, whether the distributions
are IGFR, i.e., whether v1(x)/x is increasing or decreasing, depends only on the sign
of the location parameter a. F is IGFR whenever a ≥ 0, i.e., when the lower end of
the support lies between 0 and 1.33
Kleinberg and Yuan (2013) show that assuming hyperregularity has some attractive
31Neither of these assumption ensures integrability. To this end, Kleinberg and Yuan (2013)
introduce the third assumption of c-boundedness which requires that the result of our Proposition
3 holds for some constant c, i.e., E[X] ≤ c p∗(1− F (p∗)).
32Ziya et al. (2004) also point out earlier papers from this literature which had “reinvented”
Myerson regularity in the formulations (ii) and (iii) from Proposition 1, Bitran and Mondschein
(1997) and Cachon and Lariviere (2001).
33These considerations illustrate the special role of the equal revenue distribution a = 0, b = 1,
which is the only distribution at the boundary of both IGFR and Myerson’s regularity. It is also
a boundary case of the third related assumption discussed by Ziya et al. (2004), concavity of
x(1− F (x)).
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implications in auction theory, see their Section 5. Yet, as shown in Section 3.2
above, their main argument for the unavoidability of assuming hyperregularity does
not apply to distributions which are λ-regular for some λ < 1. Assuming λ-regularity
thus has the potential of replacing their three assumptions (regularity, IGFR and
c-boundedness) by a single one.
6 λ-Regularity in Quantity Space
Bulow and Roberts (1989) show that Myerson regularity becomes a classical con-
cavity condition on a monopolist’s revenue if the price-setting problem studied so
far is transformed into a problem of choosing quantities. This section provides a
brief and informal discussion of what λ-regularity means under this transformation.
Let us interpret the function 1−F (p) as a demand curve and consider a monopolistic
seller who sets price p. The seller’s revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare
(the sum of the former two) can then be written, respectively, as
p(1− F (p)),
∫ ∞
p
(x− p)f(x)dx =
∫ ∞
p
1− F (x)dx.
and
p(1− F (p)) +
∫ ∞
p
1− F (x)dx.
Following Bulow and Roberts (1989), let us substitute q = 1 − F (p) and interpret
1−F (p) as the quantity q ∈ [0, 1] sold when the unit price is p. Thus, we can write
the price per unit when selling the quantity q as P (q) = F−1(1 − q). Under this
transformation, revenue R(q), consumer surplus C(q) and social welfare S(q) can be
written as
R(q) = qP (q), C(q) = −
∫ q
0
y P ′(y)dy and S(q) =
∫ q
0
P (y)dy.
As P is decreasing, social welfare S is always concave in quantity. The generalized
increasing virtual valuations formulation of λ-regularity turns into the condition
that
hλ(q) = λP (q) + qP
′(q)
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is decreasing in q.34 For λ = 1, we recover the result that R′(q) = h1(q) is decreasing,
implying that revenue is concave in q. For λ = 0, the condition turns into C ′(q) =
−h0(q) being increasing. The montone hazard rate assumption thus implies that
consumer surplus is convex in quantity. Due to the concavity of S and the relation
R′(q) = S ′(q) − C ′(q), this is a sufficient condition for concavity of R. For general
λ < 1, we can write
hλ(q) = R
′(q)− (1− λ)S ′(q).
λ-regularity thus turns into the condition that revenue is sufficiently concave, re-
quiring that revenue remains concave if social welfare times a positive, λ-dependent
constant is subtracted.
7 Conclusion
Traditionally, properties like Myerson regularity and the monotone hazard rate con-
dition were viewed as qualitative features that a distribution either fulfills or does
not fulfill. Interpreting the smallest λ for which a distribution is λ-regular as an
index of regularity, allows for a more quantitative perspective. λ-regularity replaces
the question whether a distribution is Myerson regular. It focuses instead on how
Myerson regular a distribution is. Section 3 demonstrates that with regard to the
performance of auctions and sales mechanisms, the answer often depends explicitly
on the value of λ. Moreover, the results are sharp at boundary cases of λ-regularity.
In a sense, λ-regularity is an almost na¨ıve strengthening of Myerson regularity, re-
placing weak monotonicity by monotonicity with a lower bound on the slope. Yet
the concept has deep connections to the literatures on stochastic orders and on gen-
eralized concavity. In Section 3.1, we provided several pointers to other applications
in which λ-regularity helps gaining a better understanding of how results depend on
the regularity of distributions. We are convinced that there are many more contexts
in which the concept will prove fruitful.
34Monotonicity of generalized failure rates turns into the equivalent condition that q1+λP ′(q) is
decreasing.
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A Proofs
We begin with an elementary calculation that is used in several of our proofs:
Lemma 7. Let a ≥ 0 and b > 0 and λ < 1 with λ 6= 0 be three real numbers. When
λ < 0 assume in addition a < − 1
λ
. Then it holds that∫ ∞
0
Γλ(a+ bx)dx =
Γλ(a)
1−λ
(1− λ)b (1)
Proof of Lemma 7. For λ ∈ (0, 1), the claim follows from
∫ ∞
0
Γλ(a+ bx)dx =
1
b
∫ ∞
a
(1 + λx)−
1
λdx =
1
λb
∫ ∞
1+λa
x−
1
λdx =
(1 + λa)−
1−λ
λ
(1− λ)b .
For λ < 0, we obtain the same result from the following modified argument:∫ ∞
0
Γλ(a+ bx)dx =
1
b
∫ − 1
λ
a
(1 + λx)−
1
λdx =
−1
λb
∫ 1+λa
0
x−
1
λdx =
(1 + λa)−
1−λ
λ
(1− λ)b .
Proof of Lemma 1. We define
Hλ(x) =
(1− F (x))−λ − 1
λ
. (2)
Since this expression satisfies Hλ(0) = 0 and H
′
λ(x) = rλ(x), this definition is
consistent with the integral for Hλ given in the lemma. Applying Γλ on both sides
of (2) gives 1−F (x) = Γλ(Hλ(x))). Finally, notice that Hλ takes values in [0,− 1λ ] for
λ < 0 and in [0,∞) for λ > 0, thus falling into the regions where Γλ is non-zero.
Proof of Proposition 1. Equivalence of (i-iii) follows from the fact that all three
claims correspond to the first order condition
(1 + λ)f(x)2 + (1− F (x))f ′(x) ≥ 0
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for all x ∈ (α, ω). Equivalence of (iii) and (iv) follows from the fact that35
G−11,λ(F (x)) =
(1− F (x))−λ − 1
λ
.
which coincides with Hλ by (2).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) is well-known for the boundary cases Fµ,λ and Gρ,λ which
are simply rescaled Pareto distributions. The proof for general F proceeds in two
steps: We first show that λ-regularity with λ < 1 implies existence of a finite mean µ.
Existence of higher moments is then deduced from a comparison with Fµ,λ. Assume
F is not a boundary case so that Hλ is not globally linear. Since Hλ is convex
and increasing with Hλ(0) = 0, we can find a constant ρ > 0 such that ρx and
H intersect exactly twice on R+, in 0 and at some s > 0. By convexity, we have
H(x) ≥ ρx for x ≥ s. We can thus bound the mean of F by
µ =
∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
Γλ(Hλ(x))dx ≤ s+
∫ ∞
s
Γλ(ρx)dx ≤ s+ 1
ρ(1− λ) <∞.
where the final summand on the right hand side is the mean of Gρ,λ. Notice next
36
that the convex function Hλ and the corresponding (linear) function Hµ,λ(x) =
x
µ(1−λ) of Fµ,λ have at most one intersection at a positive x where Hλ intersects Hµ,λ
from below. Accordingly, there exists x0 such that 1−F (x) ≥ 1−Fµ,λ(x) for x ≤ x0
while the converse inequality holds for x ≥ x0. Combining this observation with∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)dx−
∫ ∞
0
1− Fµ,λ(x)dx = 0
shows that ∫ ∞
0
ϕ(x)(1− F (x))dx−
∫ ∞
0
ϕ(x)(1− Fµ,λ(x))dx ≤ 0
for any increasing function ϕ(x) by Lemma 7.1 of Chapter 4 in Barlow and Proschan
(1981). To complete the proof of (i), it suffices to note that choosing ϕ(x) = pxp−1
turns the latter inequality into a bound between the pth moments of F and Fµ,λ
35Notice that the choice of ρ = 1 is arbitrary here. Dominance of G1,λ in the convex-transform
order is equivalent to dominance of Gρ,λ for any ρ > 0.
36The remainder of the proof of (i) is adapted from Theorem 4.8 and Corollary 4.9 in Barlow
and Proschan (1965).
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since
E[Xp] =
∫ ∞
0
p xp−1(1− F (x))dx.
Existence of moments for Fµ,λ thus implies existence of moments for F . It remains
to prove part (ii) of the proposition. Since h is strictly increasing and concave, its
inverse h−1 exists and is convex. The cumulative distribution function of h(X) is
given by Fh(x) = F (h
−1(x)). By Proposition 1, λ-regularity of F is equivalent to
convexity of Hλ(x) = G1,λ(F (x)). Since the composition of two convex functions is
convex, we find that G1,λ(Fh(x)) = Hλ(h
−1(x)) is convex, implying λ-regularity of
Fh.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since vλ is increasing for some λ < 1, v1(x) = (1−λ)x+vλ(x) is
strictly increasing over (α, ω), implying that v1 has at most one zero. By Proposition
2, F possesses a finite mean and thus
E[v1(x)] =
∫ ∞
0
xf(x)dx−
∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)dx = 0,
so that v1 must have at least one zero which lies in the interior of the support.
Proof of Lemma 3. Since Hλ is convex, we have Hλ(µ) ≤ E[Hλ(X)] by Jensen’s
inequality. We claim that E[Hλ(X)] =
1
1−λ . Using that Γλ is decreasing then yields
1− F (µ) = Γλ(Hλ(µ)) ≥ Γλ(E[Hλ(X)]) = Γλ
(
1
1− λ
)
which is the first inequality. To see the claim, we write
E[Hλ(X)] =
∫ ∞
0
Hλ(x)f(x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
∫ x
0
rλ(y)f(x)dydx
=
∫ ∞
0
rλ(y)
∫ ∞
y
f(x)dxdy =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (y))−λf(y)dy
where the last step uses the definition of rλ. The substitution u = F (y) then gives
E[Hλ(X)] =
∫ 1
0
(1− u)−λdu = 1
1− λ.
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For the second inequality, we rewrite the condition v1(p
∗) = 0 into
p∗rλ(p∗) = (1− F (p∗))−λ = Γλ(Hλ(p∗))−λ = 1 + λHλ(p∗), (3)
using the definitions of rλ and Γλ. Since Hλ is convex with H
′
λ = rλ and Hλ(0) = 0,
we obtain by (3) that
Hλ(p
∗) ≤ p∗rλ(p∗) = 1 + λHλ(p∗). (4)
Solving this bound forHλ(p
∗) yieldsHλ(p∗) ≤ 11−λ . Applying the decreasing function
Γλ to both sides of this inequality completes the proof since 1−F (p∗) = Γλ(Hλ(p∗)).
Proof of Corollary 1. We give a combined proof of both assertions. By Lemma 3,
we have Hλ(0) = 0 and Hλ(z) ≤ 11−λ for z ∈ {µ, p∗}. Convexity of Hλ thus implies
Hλ(x) ≤ x
z(1− λ)
for x ∈ [0, z]. Applying the decreasing function Γλ to this inequality yields
1− F (x) = Γλ(Hλ(x)) ≥ Γλ
(
x
z(1− λ)
)
= 1− Fz,λ(x)
by Definition 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. We need to show an upper bound on Γλ(Hλ(p
∗Γλ(Hλ(p∗)))).
Since Hλ is convex with Hλ(0) = 0 and since Γλ(Hλ(p
∗)) = 1 − F (p∗) ∈ (0, 1), we
obtain
Hλ (p
∗Γλ(Hλ(p∗))) ≤ Hλ(p∗) · Γλ(Hλ(p∗)) = Φ(Hλ(p∗)).
where Φ(x) = x · Γλ(x). Since Φ has derivative
Φ′(x) = Γλ(x)
(
1− x
1 + λx
)
,
27
Φ is increasing for x ≤ (1− λ)−1 and decreasing for x ≥ (1− λ)−1. We obtain37
Hλ (p
∗Γλ(Hλ(p∗))) ≤ Φ(Hλ(p∗)) ≤ Φ
(
1
1− λ
)
=
1
1− λ Γλ
(
1
1− λ
)
.
Applying the decreasing function Γλ on both sides of the inequality completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since Hλ is convex with H
′
λ = rλ, we have Hλ(x) ≥ Hλ(p∗)+
rλ(p
∗)(x− p∗) and thus
µ =
∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
Γλ(Hλ(x))dx ≤
∫ ∞
0
Γλ(Hλ(p
∗) + rλ(p∗)(x− p∗))dx.
The constants a = Hλ(p
∗) − p∗rλ(p∗) and b = rλ(p∗) are non-negative by (4). For
λ < 0, we further have a ≤ Hλ(p∗) ≤ − 1λ as noted in the proof of Lemma 1.
Applying Lemma 7 with these constants a and b thus yields
µ ≤ Γλ(Hλ(p
∗)− p∗rλ(p∗))1−λ
(1− λ)rλ(p∗) . (5)
By (3), we have p∗rλ(p∗) = 1 + λHλ(p∗) and thus
Γλ(Hλ(p
∗)− p∗rλ(p∗)) = Γλ((1− λ)Hλ(p∗)− 1) = (1− λ)− 1λΓλ(Hλ(p∗))
where the final step uses the definition of Γλ. (5) can thus be written as
µ ≤ (1− λ)
λ−1
λ
(1− λ) ·
Γλ(Hλ(p
∗))1−λ
rλ(p∗)
= (1− λ)− 1λ · p∗Γλ(Hλ(p∗))
where the last step follows from (3). As Γλ(Hλ(p
∗)) = 1 − F (p∗), the proof is
complete.
Proof of Proposition 4. The first bound follows directly from Proposition 3 and
E[X1{X≥p}] ≤ µ. For the second, notice first that by partial integration
E[X1{X≥p}] =
∫ ∞
p
xf(x)dx = p(1− F (p)) +
∫ ∞
p
1− F (x)dx.
37This bound is sharp at the boundary cases of λ-regularity which satisfy Hλ(p
∗) = 11−λ .
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It thus suffices to bound the second summand by (1−λ)−1 p(1−F (p)). By convexity
of Hλ, we obtain∫ ∞
p
1− F (x)dx =
∫ ∞
p
Γλ(Hλ(x))dx ≤
∫ ∞
p
Γλ(Hλ(p) + rλ(p)(x− p))dx
=
∫ ∞
0
Γλ(Hλ(p) + rλ(p)y)dy =
Γλ(Hλ(p))
1−λ
(1− λ)rλ(p) , (6)
where the last step uses Lemma 7 with constants a = Hλ(p) and b = rλ(p). a and b
are non-negative, and, as argued in the proof of Lemma 1, we have a ≤ − 1
λ
for λ < 0.
Arguing as in (3), we conclude from p ≥ p∗ that v1(p) ≥ 0 and thus Γλ(Hλ(p))−λ ≤
p rλ(p). Combining this estimate with (6) yields the desired inequality∫ ∞
p
1− F (x)dx ≤ pΓλ(Hλ(p))
1− λ =
p(1− F (p))
1− λ .
Proof of Lemma 5. For any increasing function h with E[h(X1)] <∞, the sequence
E[h(X1:n)] is increasing and concave in n, since it is the sequence of first order
statistics of the transformed random variables h(Xi), and since sequences of first
order statistics are always increasing and concave, see Szech (2011), Lemma 1. The
claim of the lemma follows from this observation by choosing the increasing function
as h(x) = vλ(x). To see this, notice first that a1 = E[vλ(X1:1)] = (1 − λ)E[X].
Moreover, denote by F1:n(x) = F (x)
n, f1:n(x) = nF (x)
n−1f(x) the distribution
function and density of X1:n and by F2:n(x) = F1:n(x) + n(1 − F (x))F (x)n−1 the
distribution function of X2:n.
38 Then we obtain
an = E[vλ(X1:n)] = λE[X1:n]−
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))
f(x)
· f1:n(x)dx
= λE[X1:n] +
∫ ∞
0
F2:n(x)− F1:n(x)dx = λE[X1:n]− (E[X1:n −X2:n])
for n ≥ 2 which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. The first inequalityR∗n ≥ E[X2:n] simply restates that revenue-
optimal auctions dominate auctions without reserve in terms of revenue. The second
38For background see David and Nagaraja (2003).
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inequality is a rearrangement of the implication an ≥ a1 of Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 6. We begin with the second inequality between the mean and the
minimum. Notice first that for any θ > −1 we have∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x)θf(x)dx =
∫ 1
0
(1− u)θdu = 1
1 + θ
.
Therefore, the function
g(x) =
(
2− λ
1− λ(1− F (x))− 1
)
(1− F (x))−λf(x)
satisfies
∫∞
0
g(x)dx = 0. Moreover, by monotonicity and positivity of 1 − F , g
switches signs exactly once, from positive to negative. By Lemma 7.1 of Chapter 4
in Barlow and Proschan (1981), we thus have for any decreasing function h that
0 ≤
∫ ∞
0
h(x)g(x)dx.
Choosing the decreasing function h as h(x) = 1
rλ(x)
yields
0 ≤ 2− λ
1− λ
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))2dx−
∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)dx = 2− λ
1− λE[X2:2]− E[X1].
The inequality for the maximum follows from the one for the minimum via
E[X1:2] = 2E[X1]− E[X2:2] ≤
(
2− 1− λ
2− λ
)
E[X1] =
3− λ
2− λE[X1]
Proof of Corollary 3. Notice that the distribution function of Xn:n is Fn:n(x) = 1−
(1− F (x))n and thus
E[Xn:n] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))ndx. (7)
The proof of the corollary is analogous to the bound for X2:2 in Lemma 6 except
that we choose the function g as
g(x) =
(
n− λ
1− λ (1− F (x))
n−1 − 1
)
(1− F (x))−λf(x).
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Proof of Proposition 5. Equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows since the first order con-
dition associated with (i),
0 ≤ H
′
λ(x)x−Hλ(x)
x2
=
rλ(x)x−Hλ(x)
x2
is equivalent to (ii). For y ≤ x, we can choose θ = y/x ∈ [0, 1]. (i) and (iii) are then
both the same as Hλ(y)/y ≤ Hλ(x)/x for all y ≤ x.
Proof of Corollary 4. The first inequality in the corollary comes from Lemma 3 in
the λ-regular case. The only consequence of λ-regularity used in its proof is Hλ(p
∗) ≤
p∗rλ(p∗). This holds under λ∗-regularity by Proposition 5 (ii). The second inequality
is proved in Corollary 1. The proof is based on the first inequality and the fact that
Hλ(x) ≤ xzHλ(z) for x ≤ z, the definition of λ∗-regularity. The third inequality is
from Lemma 4. The only application of λ-regularity in the proof follows from part
(iii) of Proposition 5 with θ = Γλ(Hλ(p
∗)) and x = p∗.
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